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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 17/03/2007 Accident number: 441 
Accident time: 11:00 Accident Date: 08/10/2003 
Where it occurred: Talailmannar Pier 
East, Mannar District 
Country: Sri Lanka 
Primary cause: Unavoidable (?) Secondary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: 11/10/2003 
ID original source: SF, MF, CH: 
MAN/03/002 
Name of source: Private 
Organisation: [Name removed]  








Date record created: 17/03/2007 Date  last modified: 17/03/2007 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: WGS 84 Coordinates fixed by: GPS 
Map east: 79°43'50.70 E Map north: 09°06'22.70 N 
Map scale: TALAIMANNAR Map series: ABMP 
Map edition: 1 Map sheet: 11 
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
no independent investigation available (?) 
metal-detector not used (?) 




Two versions of an internal investigation were made available in 2006. The first is a 
preliminary report and the second is a more complete final report. Both are reproduced below, 
edited for anonymity. 
 
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION REPORT 
Part 1 – Description of the Incident 
[A picture of the accident site – inside a rubble-strewn building – is shown below. The mine 
crater is alongside the fallen visor.] 
 
Narrative: During the removal of rubble, sand and rubbish in a holding area inside a building 
(area has been cleared with metal detector and excavation drills in April 2003 by [the same 
demining group]), the deminer was walking backwards and reaching the rear wall to fill his 
shovel again, as an uncontrolled detonation occurred. The detonation caused the traumatic 
amputation of his left foot. 
The area is located in front of a doorway inside a building, which was used since April 2003 
as holding area for rubble, sand, rocks and vegetation. The area had been cleared in April 
2003 under the supervision of [Name removed]. 
The crater was around 12 cm deep and 30 cm wide some parts of plastic body of the mine 
were found inside and around the crater. Due to the nature of the ground inside the building – 
sand mixed with rubble – it was quite difficult to determine the exact depth and diameter of 
the crater. 
[Parts of the mine are shown below.] 
 
The weather was clear and hot. There was no vegetation. The ground was mixed, “As the 
ground is a mix of sand and rubble, consequently it can be classified from soft to hard.” 
The last external QA was on 23rd September by DMAO Vavuniya personnel. 
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The Victim had completed his basic deminer course in November 2002. 
The team had been working at the site for eight months, working 149 days. 
On the day of the accident they had been working for 3 hours and 45 minutes. 
The Victim was wearing PPE and visor, and there was “no damage on PPE/Visor resulting to 
the blast or projection of plastic parts of the mine body”. 
[The Victim’s left shoe is shown below.] 
 
It took four minutes for medics to start treatment which went on for 15 minutes before the 
Victim was taken to hospital in a journey that took 21 minutes. The ambulance arrived 11:40 
AM in the Mannar Govt hospital and the treatment was terminated by 14:00 PM. 
 
Internal Investigation Report: MAN/03/002 
Introduction 
This accident report has been written in accordance with the terms of reference supplied by 
Mrs. [Name removed] [Technical Advisor] District Mine Action Office Vavuniya assigned by 
[Name removed] [Senior Advisor & Secretary National Steering Committee on Mine Action].  
A copy of the terms of reference is attached as Annex a. 
1. Following persons investigated the circumstances surrounding the mine incident: 
[Names removed] 
2. When, where, how and why the accident occurred 
The accident occurred Wednesday 08th October 2003 at approximately 11:00 am on the 
demining site in Thalaimannar Pier (Mannar District of Northern Province of Sri Lanka; 
Long/Lat E79° 43’ 50.70” / N09° 06’ 22.70”). There were several witnesses while the accident 
occurred, such as the supervisor, team leader, section leader and one deminer. 
Progression of accident 
During the removal of spoil (rubble, sand, metal pieces, rubbish) out of the holding area inside 
a building (area has been cleared with metal detector and excavation drills in April 2003), the 
deminer was walking backwards and reaching the rear wall to fill his shovel again, as an 
uncontrolled detonation occurred. The detonation caused the traumatic amputation of his left 
foot. 
The minefield in general 
The minefield is situated between the Navy base (3m high wall) and the main road in 
Talaimannar Pier. The minefield contains a number of abandoned buildings, is clearly fenced 
off and has been used over the past years as a rubbish dump. Its purpose was to protect the 
Navy base against an attack from east and has a clear pattern. On the beach side the mines 
were laid in a 4-row mine belt. The remaining part of the minefield contains more than 20 
abandoned buildings where the mines were in front of doorways, below windows and on the 
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backside (east side) of the buildings. As such the team working in Talaimannar was well 
aware of the critical spots of this minefield. By the end of September the team had cleared 
over 12,000 m2 and 1,165 AP mines. 
The accident site 
In April 2003 the team still carried out technical survey. The main objective was to obtain the 
required access throughout the entire minefield. Since the area was restricted by heavy 
vegetation, there was a need for temporary holding areas. The supervisor in charge decided 
the building (shop) would be an appropriate site for rubble, sand, metal pieces and 
vegetation. Consequently the inside of the building has been entirely cleared with metal 
detector and excavation drills in April 2003 and 3 mines (Chinese Type 72 A) were found. The 
supervisor decided to tape off the short corridor adjacent to the shop – to be cleared later. 
Nevertheless, the supervisor, the team leader and deminer visually inspected the corridor 
from the doorway, as such standing on the spot, where the accident happened. During the 
period April to October the site has been used intensively as holding area – left side for 
vegetation and right side for rubble, sand and metal pieces – consequently the ground has 
been walked over countless times. 
Observations 
Following observations are clear evidence that [Demining Group]’s worksite (minefield 
Talaimannar Pier east) has undergone a certain level of intrusion, because: 
1. the local population did not consistently stop throwing rubbish into the area after 
[Demining Group] started the clearance operations; 
2. evidence of disturbance / destruction of the permanent fence around the minefield; 
3. recently, in 2 cases where we cleared access to abandoned buildings, the team and 
section leaders checked the inside of the building and as well visually through the 
windows and all doors if there is any evidence of mines. They did not find anything. A 
couple of days later as they did the planning for the clearance around these buildings, 
they found 2 AP mines (Chinese Type 72 A) laying close to a doorstep and outside in 
front of a window. It was very obvious these mines were placed and/or thrown there, 
as they would have been visible before. 
4. in one of these two buildings we found evidence that local were using the building as 
access to collect coconuts during our absence. 
The incidents were reported to the respective authorities and the locals were asked not to 
enter the area unless [Demining Group] has completed the clearance. Mine Risk Education 
(MRE) is an ongoing process executed by the local NGO called CTF. 
 
Conclusions / possible options 
By taking into consideration all facts and talk over various scenarios the internal investigation 
team came to the following options regarding the mine in previous cleared ground, which then 
caused the uncontrolled detonation. 
Option 1) [Demining Group] missed the mine during the previous clearance in April 
2003 
The entire building has been cleared by detector and where necessary by excavation drills. 
Especially the area close to the doorstep – where the uncontrolled detonation happened – 
was cleared purely by excavation due to the high metal contamination, the close presence of 
the reinforced concrete wall and red bricks in the corner, which eliminated the proper use of 
the metal detector. The inside of the building has been used as holding area and has been 
walked over countless times. The spoil carried into the building was the result of excavation in 
areas near by; consequently it is impossible to miss an item of the size 7.8 x 3.8 cm in green 
colour.  
=> Therefore Option 1 unlikely 
Option 2) While clearing the corridor the mine was dislodged and rolled down into the 
area where the accident happened 
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Very unlikely since the 4 mines found in the corridor were buried and additionally covered 
(approx. 30 – 40 cm) by rubble. If the mine rolled down, the deminer who assisted (the 
casualty) to clean the rubble, would have seen the mine laying on the surface because his 
position / view was directed all the time towards the rear wall / doorstep. 
Note: A comparison blowing up of a AP mine type 72 A buried 5 cm inside the building 
(carried out 14.10.) resulted to the same extend of crater, consequently the investigation team 
concludes the mine had to be buried.  
=> Therefore Option 2 unlikely 
Option 3) Someone discarded the mine after we had cleared the area 
Option 4) Someone purposely planted the mine after we had cleared the area 
Particular observations (described above) indicate the direction of options 3 and 4. 
Nevertheless, the investigation team is not able to give a clear statement whether option 3 or 
4 is more likely the truth. 
=> Therefore Option 3 or 4 in all probability 
Recommendations 
(1) The investigation team considers the time factor – start of task till handing over – as one of 
the critical issues regarding the clearance site Talaimannar Pier east. On the one hand 
[Demining Group] should have pushed handing over the cleared area part by part as a 
ongoing process, consequently to limit the risk to be liable by resettle people as soon as 
possible. On the other hand and for the future [Demining Group] must take this factor into 
consideration when planning clearance tasks – divide large areas into sub-areas. 
(2) The local authorities have to be increasingly involved in the security and appropriate policy 
of such minefields. In addition all players in mine clearance and UNDP Mine Action need to 
discuss and propose adequate solutions regarding “secure access to minefields”. [Demining 
Group] will take immediate action to reinforce the fencing and set-up a single entry/exit of the 
remaining part of the Talaimannar Pier east minefield. 
(3) The entire inside of the building (shop) must be re-excavated. All sensitive areas 
(backside of the buildings, doorways and outside windows) in the southern part of the 
minefield, which will be handed over soon, have to be re-checked. In addition all holding 
areas have to be re-checked. 
Note: The team completed these tasks 17th October and no mines or UXO were found. 
(4) The investigation team considers the process of reinforced / complete Mine Risk 
Education (MRE) as indispensable. 
The cause, nature and extent of injuries caused as a result of the accident 
The deminer was walking backwards and reaching the rear wall (his left foot must have had a 
distance of approx. 30cm from the wall/doorway) to fill his shovel again, as he must have 
stepped on the AP mine (Chinese Type 72 A) and an uncontrolled detonation occurred. The 
detonation caused the traumatic amputation of his left foot. 
The cause, nature and extent of damage to any property 
There was no damage caused to any [Demining Group] equipment or private property.   
The level of training and experience of the people involved in the accident 
Both deminers, the casualty and the deminer clearing the site in April 2003, had successfully 
completed the [Demining Group] basic deminer course in November 2003. Consequently both 
had at that time 4 respectively 9 months operational experience in the field what is considered 
to be a good level of experience particularly after being deployed most of their time in a 
minefield like Talaimannar Pier east. Both deminers cleared up to date more than hundred AP 
mines.  
The daily work schedule of the organisation and the specific work schedule of the day 
of the accident 
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Work schedule according to [Demining Group] SOP (part 5, para 5.11.2 and 5.12): Deminers 
are not to work for more than 50 minutes and a 10-minute break. 
Specific work schedule: As it gets very hot in the afternoon, the team starts as soon as there 
is full daylight. In general each shift is maximum 45 minutes followed by a 15-minute break. At 
08:00 am the team has a 30-minute breakfast break and between 12:15 pm and 01:00 pm a 
45-minute lunch break. The last shift finished at 01:45 pm consequently the cumulative 
productive operational time was 5 hrs 15 minutes. Following the last shift, the demolition of 
cleared mines and the cleaning of all equipment take place. Approx. 03:00 pm the team 
heads back to the field base in Pesalai. 
The extend of leave and rest periods for deminers preceding the accident 
The deminers have every month a long weekend (3 days) and over Christmas/ New Year 
[Demining Group] shuts down operations for 2 weeks.  
Dates of last internal QA and results of that QA 
Internal QA is an ongoing process executed by supervisor, team leader and section leader. 
Areas cleared by metal detector will be partly re-checked. However, the areas cleared by full 
excavation will not be re-excavated but the drills are continuously supervised. 
Dates of last external QA and results of that QA 
External QA has been carried out 3rd and 23rd of September. The results were positive and 
no complaints reported. 
The suitability of PPE worn by deminers and the demining equipment being employed on 
the site. Determine the extend to which the use of PPE assisted in the reduction on injuries to 
the deminer 
The deminer was wearing his personal protective equipment – vest and visor. This protective 
equipment will not prevent or reduce the injury of such an accident. 
Dates of last refresher training for the team and if the team involved in the accident 
attended that training 
The last refresher training was carried out by the end of June 2003 (after the occurrence of 
[Demining Group]’s first accident in Talaimannar Pier east) on the following issues: 
Action “on signal reading and investigation“ including immediate reporting to supervision staff 
in case of any problems or difficulties occur; “full excavation drill and using detector in areas 
heavily contaminated by metal” 
Note: The action on “full excavation drill and using detector in areas heavily contaminated by 
metal” was re-trained by re-clearing the entire beach area where the first accident happened. 
The level of medical support and evacuation available on that day of the accident and the 
extend of training and preparation prior to the accident 
One (1) ambulance and 2 trained medics with fully equipped trauma kit were available on site. 
The medics and ambulance reached the deminer within approximately 4 minutes of the 
detonation. He was immediately given first aid and evacuated to Mannar Base Hospital, in 
accordance with the casualty evacuation drill. The medic acted professionally, quickly and in 
accordance with his training. 
Determine whether the injury was contributed to or caused by: 
1. An error in SOP of the organisation 
The accident was neither contributed to nor caused by an error in the SOP. 
2. An error in application of SOP by the deminer involved 
As the deminer was cleaning in a previously cleared area no error or breach of the SOP 
occurred from the side of the deminer. 
3. A failure or weakness in the command and control structure imposed by the agency 
No obvious failure in the command and control structure imposed by [Demining Group]. 
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4. Environmental conditions – terrain, vegetation, weather 
No, the weather was good at the accident time no strong wind or unusual temperature was 
reported. 
5.  Any other cause 
Most likely a disposed, relocated or re-laid through a third party.  
 
The report is to make conclusions on the following: 
a) The key factors contributing to the accident; this may include any shortfalls in training, 
procedures, equipment or management 
No specific key factors contributing to the accident. 
See Para 2a) for observations, conclusions and recommendations 
 
The report is to make recommendations on: 
a) Modifications of training or procedures 
No modifications of training or procedures are required. 
b) Modifications to equipment 
No modifications to equipment are required. 
c) Corrective action required for management (command and control) of the minefield 
site 
It is recommended to secure access for third parties into the minefield. {Demining Group] will 
immediately reinforce the fencing of the remaining un-cleared area. Planning and clearance of 
large tasks must consider the partitioning as a key factor. 
For more details, see Para 2a) for observations, conclusions and recommendations 
d) Any other immediate or longer-term action that should be taken to prevent such 
accidents occurring in the future. 
No. See Para 2) for observations, conclusions and recommendations 
 
Signed: [Demining Group] Programme Manager  and Senior Technical Advisor   
[Scanned versions of witness statements are held on file.] 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 588 Name: [Name removed] 
Age: 24 Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: 40 minutes 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: frontal apron, Long 
visor 
 
Summary of injuries: 
AMPUTATION/LOSS: Leg Below knee 
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COMMENT: See Medical report. 
 
Medical Report 
The following is the content of a Medical report from “Base Hospital, Mannar”, dated 14th 
October 2003, summarised for anonymity. 
The victim was admitted at 11:40 on 8th October 2003. The below knee (left) amputation is 
done. I am of the opinion that he needs about three months bed rest and physiotherapy. 
Signed: District Medical Officer 
In 2006, it was reported that the Victim had been re-deployed by the Demining Group but had 
subsequently left their employment. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Unavoidable” because the mine was either 
placed after clearance or missed during clearance some months before, so the Victim was not 
searching in the area. The secondary cause is listed as a “Field Control inadequacy” because 
the investigators recognised that the delay in completing this section of the site may have 
contributed to the accident by "inviting" the public to place devices in the ruined building, so 
recommended changes to site management. 
Despite the fact that the accident reports are “internal”, they appear to have been carried out 
with a view to determining and reporting the real causes, which is unusual enough to be 
worthy of note.  
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